This article first appeared in The Edge Malaysia Weekly on November 15, 2021 - November 21, 2021
This monthly report is compiled and briefly summarised by a group of lawyers on a voluntary basis for the benefit of readers of The Edge.
Please consult your own lawyers if you need advice on the cases, issues and related matters highlighted here.
Federal Court (‘FC’) and Court of Appeal (‘CA’) make concurrent rulings on the right to a fair trial and the incompetent Counsel
Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial, which is a fundamental tenet of the rule of law. It is only through the fair trial process that a person may be deprived of his life or personal liberty.
Issues
What is the required degree of incompetence of a Counsel representing an accused in a criminal case that jeopardises the right of the accused to a fair trial? Where the required threshold level of incompetence is established, should a retrial be ordered, or should the accused be acquitted and discharged? These two issues came before the FC in Yahya Hussein Mohsen Mohamed v Public Prosecutor (Judgment dated 5.9.2021).
Case summary and decision
Yahya Hussein Mohsen Mohamed (‘Appellant’), a Yemeni, was arrested at the Tawau airport. He was charged under the Dangerous Drug Act 1952 for trafficking Methamphetamine (‘Meth’), which was found in his bag. There was conflict in evidence as to the quantity involved. One witness for the prosecution said the weight of the Meth was four kilograms, while another prosecution witness said that the weight was 1,800.29 grams. The High Court (‘HC’) was satisfied that the weight was 1,800.29 grams — the weighing machine used by the latter witness was calibrated but not the machine used by the other prosecution witness. The Appellant testified that (a) he had no knowledge of the Meth in the bag because the bag was packed by a person by the name of ‘Mickey’; and (b) Mickey is the brother-in-law of his wife. The rejection of the evidence was premised on the grounds that (a) the character Mickey was never put to the prosecution’s witnesses; and (b) absence of evidence that he and Mickey enjoyed a special relationship to justify Mickey packing the bag for him when the most reasonable thing for the Appellant to do was to ask his wife to pack his bag. Accordingly, the HC held that the defence was illogical and that Mickey is merely a ‘made-up story’, or was an ‘afterthought’. He was convicted and sentenced to death. A few months after the HC’s decision, his trial counsel passed away. Prior to the hearing of his appeal in the CA, an earlier panel of the CA had allowed the Appellant to adduce fresh evidence. The additional evidence was given by the Appellant, his wife and an officer from the Yemeni Embassy in Malaysia (‘Yemeni Official’). In the additional or fresh evidence, the Appellant testified that (a) he had told his late trial counsel while he was in prison that he was under the impression that he was delivering some presents on Mickey’s behalf; (b) Mickey is the brother-in-law of his wife; (c) the character Mickey was disclosed at the earliest opportunity upon his arrest and in his cautioned statement he used a codename ‘Mr. Tee’ because he was told by Mickey not to mention the fact of Mickey so that Mickey could travel to Tawau to help him and this discrepancy was told to his late trial counsel; (d) his late trial counsel told him that he would ‘study’ the Appellant’s narrative and revert to him; (e) after that meeting with his late trial counsel at the prison, they never met again until the hearing in the HC, where he was told by his late trial counsel that he would only raise the issue of the discrepancy in the weight of the Meth. In summary, the evidence of his wife and the Yemeni Official were the same —
(a) Mickey was indeed the wife’s brother-in-law; (b) the Appellant had insisted that his wife be brought to the HC in Tawau to give evidence; (c) although she was present in the HC in Tawau to testify on the Appellant’s behalf, his late trial Counsel refused to call the Appellant’s wife as a witness and gave no reasons for the refusal; (d) his late Counsel did not present submission at the close of the prosecution case; and (e) he was absent during the decision of the close of the defence case.
Decision of the CA
In a unanimous decision of the CA (reported as Yahya Hussein Mohsen Abdulrab v Public Prosecutor in [2020] MLJU 1372) delivered by Abu Bakar Jais JCA (Yaacob Haji Md Sam and Hanipah Farikullah JJCA concurring), it was held that on the facts, the late Counsel had shown ‘flagrant incompetence’ on seven counts.
Flagrant incompetence included (a) challenging the prosecution’s witnesses only as to the weight of the Meth; (b) assumed an untrue and precarious position at trial because the Appellant’s defence was that the bag containing the Meth was given by Mickey to him and he was not aware of the Meth; (c) failure to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses on this defence; (d) the failure was a very serious matter as it deprived the Appellant of a fair trial and affected the Appellant’s version of his innocence; and (e) the ‘afterthought’ finding by the HC was due to the flagrant incompetency in not introducing and pursuing the Appellant’s defence of innocence.
Decision of the FC
The FC in a unanimous decision delivered by Tengku Maimun CJ (Mohd Zawawi Salleh and Nallini Pathmanathan FCJJ concurring), upheld the decision of the CA on the facts that there was flagrant incompetence in violation of the guarantee to fair trial under the Federal Constitution. However, the FC disagreed with the CA that there should be a retrial because the Appellant had been imprisoned for eight years, six of which was on death row. As such, it would result in substantial injustice to the Appellant to be in incarceration all over again. In acquitting and discharging the Appellant, the FC rejected the arguments of the Deputy Public Prosecutor that (a) it was not the fault of the prosecution to warrant a discharge and acquittal on what was a perceived technicality; and (b) nulling the conviction on account of flagrant incompetency would open up the floodgates in encouraging such arguments in the future.
(1) Rejection of prosecution’s ‘no fault’ argument
(2) Rejection of the ‘floodgates’ argument
Federal Court (‘FC’) clarifies the misconception between the concepts of ‘seat of arbitration’ (‘Juridical Seat’) under Arbitration Act 2005 (‘AA’) and the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak under the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘CJA’)
Article 121 of the Federal Constitution provides for two High Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and status — the High Court in Malaya (‘HCM’) and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak (‘HCSS’) and the HCM and HCSS enjoy concurrent but non-competing territorial jurisdiction. It is a non-competing territorial jurisdiction because s 23 of the CJA provides that actions are to be filed at the place or location where the cause of action arose. If the cause of action arose in Sabah, then the HCSS has territorial jurisdiction (‘Territorial Jurisdiction’) in respect of the dispute and not the HCM. The choice of court is a matter of law and not a matter for agreement between the litigants. Under the AA, whether in respect of a domestic or international arbitration, parties to an arbitration agreement are free to choose the Juridical Seat of arbitration or the particular location or place within a nation as to where the arbitration shall take place. In the absence of agreement, the arbitral tribunal determines the Juridical Seat. The freedom to choose the Juridical Seat under the AA is a result of the legislature giving primacy to the principle of party autonomy and the chosen Juridical Seat determines the applicable procedural law of an arbitration (lex arbitri or the curial law). The powers conferred by the choice of the Juridical Seat is known as the ‘supervisory jurisdiction’ of the Court, providing the framework for the power of the Court to supervise and support the arbitration. The supervisory powers include granting interim reliefs in aid of arbitration, registration of arbitral awards and challenges to awards. In essence, the choice of the Juridical Seat is submission by the parties to the applicable curial law where arbitration takes place.
Issues
In a domestic arbitration, given that the HCM and the HCSS enjoy concurrent jurisdiction and the curial law is uniform throughout Malaysia, is the supervisory jurisdiction (whether to grant interim reliefs in aid of arbitration, to enforce and/or annul an award) exercisable by any domestic court, be it the HCM or the HCSS such that the concept of Juridical Seat is irrelevant, including the principle of party autonomy? If so, in respect of a domestic arbitration which was heard in Kuala Lumpur (‘KL’), can the winning party choose to register the award for purposes of enforcement in any HCM within Malaysia, whether at Penang or Kelantan or elsewhere? Similarly, can the losing party choose to file an application in any HC to set aside the award made, whether in Perak, Kota Kinabalu (‘KK’) or Miri? These issues confronted the FC in Masenang Sdn Bhd v Sabanilam Enterprise Sdn Bhd (Judgment dated 3.9.2021).
Case summary and decision
The Appellant (‘Masenang’) and the Respondent (‘Sabanilam’) entered into a contract under the standard PAM construction contract. The construction site was in Panampang, near KK. A dispute arose and it was heard at the PAM Arbitration Centre in KL pursuant to the PAM Arbitration Rules. An award was handed down in favour of Masenang. Masenang filed proceedings in KL (‘KL Suit’) to register the award. Sabanilam filed proceedings in KK (‘KK Suit’) to set aside the award. These two sets of proceedings gave rise to a multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions. Masenang successfully struck out the KK Suit, premised on the reasoning that supervisory jurisdiction over the award resided in the HCM in KL. Masenang successfully registered the arbitral award as a judgment in the KL Suit. Subsequently, the appeal by Sabanilam to the Court of Appeal (‘CA’) against the striking out of the KK Suit was allowed. The CA held that the Juridical Seat of arbitration was irrelevant — Sabanilam had the right to set aside the award in the HC in KK as much as Masenang had the right to register the award in the HC in KL. The reasoning of the CA was that as the AA is applicable throughout Malaysia, the effective seat of arbitration is Malaysia. Thus, there was no need for identification of a particular “seat” within Malaysia as the same curial law is applicable throughout Malaysia, unlike in cases of international arbitration where another nation may assume the Juridical Seat and different curial law applies. At the hearing of the KK Suit that was restored by the CA, the HC in KK set aside certain paragraphs of the award and remitted the award to the arbitrator for re-determination. This resulted in two conflicting decisions of the HC in respect of a single arbitral award, one registering the award as a valid judgment, and the other remitting the award for redetermination on certain issues. The FC granted leave to Masenang to appeal against the decision of the CA. In a unanimous decision delivered by Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ (Vernon Ong and Rodzariah Bujang FCJJ concurring), the FC upon a detailed examination of the concept of the Juridical Seat in domestic and international arbitration, the concept of Territorial Jurisdiction under the CJA, the provisions of the AA and the CJA, reversed the CA’s decision.
The FC rejected the concept that Juridical Seat in domestic arbitration is irrelevant merely because the same curial law applies throughout Malaysia, or that it is only relevant in international arbitration where the curial law of one or two distinct nations may differ and the curial law of the place or location of the international arbitral proceedings will prevail. According to the FC, the flaw in the CA’s reasoning is that it ignores the principle that the ascertainment of the Juridical Seat also determines the supervisory court in which jurisdiction vests exclusively, or has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of the arbitration. In the context of the AA, which is modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law, it is wrong to conflate the regulation of arbitral proceedings under the AA with the law relating to civil disputes, or amalgamate the law relating to Territorial Jurisdiction with the law governing arbitration proceedings under the AA, which gives primacy to party autonomy. The conflation had ‘spawned no less than four appeals and caused the present state of legal chaos, which is antithetical to the order essential to any rational sytem of administration of justice’ and had also resulted in inconsistent outcomes. The FC pointed out that s 2 of the AA defines ‘High Court’ to mean ‘the High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak or either of them, as the case may require’ (original emphasis) and ‘seat of arbitration’ as ‘the place where the arbitration is based in accordance with section 22’, making no distinction between international and domestic arbitrations.
Federal Court (‘FC’) clarifies when a person may be held to be ‘practicing law’ in breach of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘LPA’)
Under the LPA, if an advocate and solicitor is adjudged a bankrupt, his practicing certificate will be suspended forthwith until his status as an advocate and solicitor is reinstated with the consent of the Bar Council.
Issues
What is exactly meant by ‘practicing law’? In cases where the practicing certificate of an advocate and solicitor is suspended, he becomes, so to speak, a lay person. As a lay person, can he or she give legal advice informally and assist a litigant in the background? Does an isolated act of giving advice constitute practicing law or must it require a systematic, regular and continuous act? These issues confronted the FC in Darshan Singh Khaira v Zulkefli Hashim and Majlis Peguam Malaysia (Intervener) (Judgment dated 13.8.2021).
Case summary and decision
Darshan Singh (‘Appellant’) was struck off the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors of the High Court of Malaya (‘Roll’) by the Disciplinary Board of the Majlis Peguam Negara (‘DB’) for practicing law without a practicing certificate as he was an adjudged bankrupt. The basis of the DB’s order was that the DB found that the Appellant had assisted the complainant (‘Zukefli’) in a traffic case in the Magistrate Court and later in proceedings in the High Court (‘HC’) and the Court of Appeal (‘CA’) without a practicing certificate. Although Zulkefli had represented himself in the Court proceedings, Zukefli had engaged the Appellant to prepare legal documentation and had sought legal advice from him. Zulkefli’s appeal in the CA was struck off on a procedural ground in that leave to appeal had not been obtained. Zulkefli then made a complaint to the Majlis Peguam Malaysia and upon that complaint, the Appellant was struck off the Roll. His attempt to set aside the order of the DB was unsuccessful in the HC and the CA. The FC gave him leave to appeal on the single issue of law — whether the giving of advice to a client of a law firm amounts to practicing law. In the FC, the Appellant argued that as a lay person, there was nothing wrong to give legal advice to a client of a law firm and the fees were not paid to him but the law firm for work done by him. In a unanimous decision delivered by Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal FCJ (Rohana Yusuf PCA and Azhar Mohamed CJM concurring), the FC rejected the arguments that (a) practicing law requires a systematic, regular and continuous act and the mere giving legal advice cannot amount to practicing law; and (b) the mere giving of legal advice without reward cannot amount to practicing law.
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