This article first appeared in The Edge Malaysia Weekly on September 12, 2022 - September 18, 2022
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The Federal Court (‘FC’) reiterates and illuminates further upon the established cardinal rules and principles relating to the admission of additional evidence after trial
The law of evidence consists of a body of rules and legal principles governing the proper administration of civil and criminal proceedings. It concerns facts that are legally relevant to the issues in a case and their admissibility as evidence to prove the existence or non-existence of facts. The body of rules and legal principles were developed and refined over the centuries. While many of the rules are found in the Evidence Act 1950, it is not exhaustive of the law of evidence.
The cardinal rule in litigation and the administration of justice is that a party must bring forth all evidence, including evidence that are obtainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence, to prove his case. This cardinal rule is described by the principle that there must be finality to litigation, or that a party cannot be allowed to fight his case by instalments. Otherwise, it is impossible to construct and maintain a rational system of justice. The absence of the cardinal rule, or its lack of enforcement, is a recipe for chaos in the administration of justice. At the other extreme, an absolute bar against additional evidence may not be fair in appropriate cases. Thus, rules and legal principles exist to determine when additional evidence may be admitted.
Issues
Where the trial of a civil or criminal matter has been concluded and judgment given by the trial court or the trier of facts, may additional evidence (‘Additional Evidence’) be admitted on appeal? If so, under what circumstances can the Additional Evidence be admitted? These issues came before the FC in Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak v Pendakwa Raya (Broad Grounds of Judgment dated 16.8.2022).
Case summary
Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak (‘Appellant’) filed three motions to adduce Additional Evidence pending his main appeals in the SRC case (‘Motion’). The Motion sought leave of the FC to adduce Additional Evidence pursuant to s 93(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘CJA’), a statutory rule conferring discretion upon the FC to admit Additional Evidence. Section 93(1) of the CJA reads:
Additional evidence
93(1) In dealing with any appeal in a criminal case the Federal Court may, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, either take such evidence itself or direct it to be taken by the High Court.
Summary of Appellant’s arguments
The Appellant claims that the Additional Evidence, if allowed to be adduced, would establish a conflict of interest giving rise to a real danger of bias on the part of the learned Judge of the High Court (‘Justice Nazlan’) and on that ground, declaration was sought that the entire SRC trial be declared null and void and for the FC to consider relief(s), including a retrial. The conflict of interest and/or bias, it was submitted, arose from Justice Nazlan’s former role as Group Counsel (‘GC’) and Group Company Secretary (‘GCS’) of the Maybank Group of Companies, including Maybank Investment Berhad (‘MIB’). The Additional Evidence consisted of documentary and viva voce evidence. It was submitted that (a) the statutory threshold in s 93 of the CJA; and (b) the common law rules applied in Malaysia for the admission of Additional Evidence (relying on the English Court of Appeal decision in R v Parks (‘Parks’), have been met.
Summary of Respondent’s arguments
Learned Counsel for the Respondent argued to the contrary — that allowing the Additional Evidence to be taken runs afoul of the important concept of finality of litigation, the evidence could have been obtained by reasonable diligence and, in any event, the Additional Evidence is hearsay and thus not credible.
Broad Grounds of Judgment
In a unanimous decision delivered by Tengku Maimun CJ (Abang Iskandar CJSS, Nallini Pathmanathan, Mary Lim and Mohamad Zabidin FCJJ concurring) in the broad grounds of judgment (‘Broad Grounds’), the three motions were dismissed.
(1) Admission of Additional Evidence — the applicable rules and principles
The FC held that the statutory terms of s 93(1) of the CJA is clear — the admission of the Additional Evidence is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised by reference to judicial precedent. In this respect, the established judicial precedent is that discretion to admit Additional Evidence is based on rational principles. It cannot be exercised unless four cumulative elements are satisfied and the affidavit in support of the application must state exactly what the witness sought to be called is prepared to say if he is called to give additional evidence. If any one of the four elements is not satisfied, Additional Evidence cannot be admitted.
(2) Application of the Law to the Facts
The documentary evidence sought to be adduced as Additional Evidence relates to the documents of the Maybank Group of Companies. One of the documents was the minutes of 1MDB’s board of directors meeting dated 6.9.2010 (‘Document DSN-16’). In Document DSN-16, the ‘supposed involvement of MIB was mentioned’. DSN-16 was served or given to the Appellant on 4.11.2019 in the 1MDB
trial, a month before the Appellant commenced his defence in the SRC trial on 3.12.2019. Another document sought to be introduced was document DSN-14 — a letter written by MIB to 1MDB (‘Document DSN-14’). It was conceded by both parties that they knew, even before the commencement of the SRC trial, Justice Nazlan’s position as GC and GSC of the Maybank Group of Companies.
(2.1) 1st Necessary Element not satisfied
The party seeking leave to adduce Additional Evidence must show that the availability of the document was not discoverable by reasonable diligence. The FC pointed out that Document DSN-16 was served on the Appellant in the 1MDB trial. From Document DSN-16, it was open to the Appellant to ask for any document related to Document DSN-16 but the Appellant did not.
(2.2) 2nd Necessary Element not satisfied
The FC held that the entirety of the Additional Evidence sought to be adduced are irrelevant to the seven charges that were preferred against the Appellant and whether the findings of Justice Nazlan are correct or not in relation to the abuse of power are questions for the main appeals. In respect of the Motion, it is unconvincing ‘that the proposed evidence establishes anything to the effect that Justice Nazlan’s findings were in any way mired by any discreet or undisclosed personal interest on his part on the establishment of SRC International Sdn Bhd and its subsequent operation such as to render him a conflicted or biased judge.’
(2.3) The allegation of bias
The FC was not persuaded that the Additional Evidence disclosed any nexus between Justice Nazlan and the charges preferred against the Appellant. Additionally, the affidavits in support of the Motion failed to ‘state exactly what it is the proposed additional evidence, both documentary and oral, will prove or say in relation to the charges brought against him’ and in this sense, the Motion ‘is a call by the applicant on the Court to investigate on possible bias rather than to act on any reliable or relevant evidence that can establish any real danger of bias’.
Federal Court (‘FC’) holds that there is no free-standing right to adjourn or vacate scheduled dates fixed for hearing of cases
The fixing of dates for trials and for hearing of appeals, whether in respect of civil or criminal cases, is carried out during case management (‘CM’) by the Deputy Registrar (‘DR’) of the Court. When a CM date is fixed, the lawyers representing the respective parties involved will attend before the Deputy Registrar. A case may be case managed more than once to ensure expeditious judicial disposal and the DR will not fix hearing dates until the parties are ready to proceed to trial or hearing. When the parties are ready to proceed, the rule of thumb is that the DR will fix hearing on dates where both sets of lawyers representing the respective parties are available to attend to hearing.
Issue
Is there an unqualified or free-standing right on the part of a party to ask for adjournment of a case scheduled for hearing on the dates fixed during CM because the accused person had appointed a fresh set of lawyers to represent him and that the fresh set of lawyers require more time to study the case? Or, is it a right in persuasion to make a request and which request will be granted in appropriate cases at the discretion of the Court? This sole issue arose in the FC in Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak v Pendakwa Raya (Broad Grounds of Judgment dated 16.8.2022).
Case summary
After the three motions to adduce further evidence (see above) were dismissed, the same five-member Bench of the FC directed the parties to proceed with the appeals fixed for hearing. However, learned Counsel for the Appellant applied to adjourn the hearing to a later date in three to four months because ‘he and his team only recently took over and that the appeals — spanning tens of thousands of documents — disclose strong serious points to be canvassed and that his team be given adequate opportunity to do a good job’. In the broad grounds of judgment, the FC first set out backdrop and procedural history of the adjournment application under consideration.
8.4.2022: On this CM date, the minutes showed that the parties were advised that the hearing would proceed on the dates fixed (15.8.2022 – 26.8.2022) (‘Scheduled Dates’)
29.4.2022: The Registry of the FC gave notice to all parties that the hearing would proceed on the Scheduled Dates.
26.7.2022: The FC received a letter from the Appellant’s former solicitors, Messrs. Shafee & Co (‘26 July Letter’), that the Appellant in a letter dated 25.7.2022 had discharged them as the Appellants’ solicitors and had appointed Messrs. Zaid Ibrahim Sufian TH Liew and Partners (‘ZI’) to take over conduct of the appeals.
26.7.2022: ZI wrote to the FC confirming the change of solicitors and requested for an urgent CM and also sought permission to participate in a CM that was already fixed for 29.7.2022. ZI also stated their intention to file a motion to adjourn the hearing of the appeals on the Scheduled Dates as ‘a wholly new team has taken over conduct’ of the appeals.
28.7.2022: The DR of the FC replied to ZI (a) confirming CM on 29.7.2022; and (b) informing that the Court’s direction that the hearing of the appeals would proceed on the Scheduled Dates. This meant the adjournment was refused.
29.7.2022: Tan Sri Shafee Abdullah attended the CM despite having been discharged by the Appellant on 25.7.2022. He also informed the Court that the digital copies of the records of appeal had been shared with ZI on 22.7.2022, notwithstanding that the discharge was only on 25.7.2022.
Decision
In a unanimous decision delivered by Tengku Maimun CJ (Abang Iskandar CJSS, Nallini Pathmanathan, Mary Lim and Mohamad Zabidin FCJJ concurring) in the broad grounds of judgment (‘Broad Grounds’), the FC was not persuaded and declined the application for adjournment. The FC held that whether to adjourn or not to adjourn a hearing is a matter of discretion of the Courts, which will be exercised appropriately ‘after a proper and wholesome consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case’. The primary reason advanced by learned Counsel for the Appellant, put bluntly, is that ‘the defence seeks an adjournment of these appeals for the simple reason that they are not prepared’. The FC pointed out that the procedural history revealed that the parties were reminded no less than four times that the appeals would be heard on the Scheduled Dates. In respect of the request to adjourn the hearing to a later date in three to four months because more time was required by the new team of lawyers, the FC took note of the practice and etiquette rules governing the legal profession that an advocate and solicitor shall not accept a brief unless he is reasonably certain of being able to appear and represent the client on the required day.
According to the FC, the 26 July Letter obviously showed ‘that the appellant took it upon himself to discharge his solicitors to the present ones, [ZI] who in turn appointed Tuan Hisyam as lead counsel’. The Appellant had in full awareness of the Scheduled Dates elected to discharge his former solicitors. He should not be allowed to turn around and say his new lawyers are not ready to proceed with the hearing.
Considering the entire circumstances, the FC was not persuaded that cogent and reasonable grounds had been advanced in support of the adjournment, citing case precedent, adverting to the constitutional rule that all persons are equal before the law and the Rule of Law demands that the Appellant be treated just like any other accused and the Arahan Amalan Ketua Hakim Negara No 2/2003, which states that cases involving public interest, amongst others, must be prioritised for the purpose of disposal.
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